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I did not make any statement upon which such a question could be based. In my first communication, I emphasized the fact that an unsocial being enjoys "every possible degree of utility," but "there is no comparison of the successive states of feeling, and hence their relations to one another have no influence" on his conduct. I have not, therefore, to account for the acquisition of the power to perceive lesser degrees of utility, but for the acquisition of the power of contrasting and comparing these feelings. I, therefore, restated the question so as to make it conform to the statements I had made.

Although this answer does not seem conclusive to Professor Giddings, I must in the main reaffirm it although it can be made more complete. I agree with him when he says that the mere passing from plenty to scarcity will not tend to develop the power to contrast and compare initial and marginal utilities. The poorer environment that I had in mind was not one where scarcity was a perpetual condition, but one where plenty and scarcity alternate. A period of plenty destroys the opposition between individuals and tends to develop social relations. The period of scarcity puts them again in an attitude of opposition, but the memory of the period of plenty will still be vivid enough to have some influence on conduct during periods of relative scarcity where the demand for food can be partially but not wholly satisfied. Remembering the plenty of the past, and hoping for a new period of plenty, animals will be more likely to restrain their aggressive tendencies than if their environment was always good or always poor. The power to contrast feelings that arise from different conditions goes along with the power to contrast the conditions out of which the feelings arise. The progressive being is he who lives under a variety of conditions, and must, therefore, acquire the power to contrast them and the feelings which they generate in him.

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"SOCIAL" VS. "SOCIETARY."

As an expedient for reinforcing the "jargon" of sociology, I suggest mobilization of the word "societary" to relieve the overworked word "social." This substitution seems advisable in view of the difficulty, which I am persuaded is largely verbal, illustrated in the difference running through and complicating the current discussion in the ANNALS, between Professor Giddings and Professor Patten, as to what is and what is not a "social" science. Professor Patten appears to assume that in order to be properly called "social" a science must deal with associations supposed to be pervaded by the spirit of

goodfellowship, kindness, companionableness, fraternity. Professor Giddings is attempting to vindicate the claims of a science which deals with phenomena embracing all the variations of hostility as well as of fraternity; but which seems open to challenge because it apparently disregards essential differences among the phenomena by applying to them generically the irenic designation “social.” Professor Patten unquestionably has the support of etymology and popular usage for his contention, so far as it relates to the word “social” alone. I cannot discover, however, that the employment of this term by sociologists seriously interferes with their own clearness of thought about the coexistence of phenomena of attraction and of repulsion in and between the human associations indiscriminately called “social” groups. Yet it is becoming evident that the term “social” has to be employed with such varying shades of meaning, that it does not afford a perfectly satisfactory means of conveying the precise idea which the sociologists attach to it in different connections. Since the sociologists must admit that they have been using the term “social” both in the popular sense and with an extended meaning, there ought to be no hesitation about acknowledging that their language has in that respect been somewhat ambiguous. Neither should there be any hesitation about resorting to terms which will reduce the ambiguity to a minimum. I propose experiment, therefore, with the word “societary,” to determine whether it may suit the purpose of designating more general phenomena than those which are “social” in the restricted sense.

Restoration of the term “societary” to common use in technical discussions will not prejudice any of the questions of methodology or classification at present in controversy. There are obviously phenomena pertaining to and characteristic of the relations of individuals living under the conditions of the various kinds of contact consequent upon occupancy of contiguous or communicating territory. Individuals so conditioned, whether in sympathy with each other or not, or whatever the kind or degree of their sympathy, are not simply individuals; they are perforce members of a reciprocally limiting association of individuals, and as such they are modified individuals; just as neither of the three atoms of oxygen in a molecule of ozone is, in that condition, an atom of free oxygen.

There may be etymological objections to employment of the noun “society” to designate groups, or combinations of groups of individuals, whose contacts with each other are not presumed to be predominantly sympathetic; yet we call such reacting individuals “societies” generically, without intentionally committing ourselves to a theory about the quality or the implications of the association. The objective

fact of continuous reciprocal influence between individuals determines our treatment of them, and our language about them, as a group or a "society." In any such "society" there are procedures which we are obliged to think of as purely individual, while there are other actions which are as obviously consequent upon the relation of association or contact. To these latter phenomena, in their most general characteristics, the term "societary" may be applied without occasion for misapprehension.

I do not wish to intrude upon the debate between Professor Giddings and Professor Patten, but I hope it will not be impertinent for me to make their argument an occasion for pointing out that there are most significant phenomena of inter-group relationship, within which sympathy can be posited only by the most questionable *a priori* reasoning. All the sciences of society have more or less to do with these phenomena. The proposed term "societary" would conveniently and appropriately designate these phenomena, and it would be of service, regardless of our hypothesis or of our ultimate conclusion with reference to the essence of human association. Thus the evolution of tribes, races, nations, governments, as well as of inferior groups, has to be interpreted not merely by estimate of reactions within the groups, but by calculation also of reactions between each group and other more or less similar groups, between which there may have been a very moderate minimum of that "consciousness of their identity in kind" which Professor Giddings presupposes. If this consciousness actuated the "chosen people" in their contacts with the "gentiles," or the Romans in their contacts with "barbarians," or Turks or Chinese in their contacts with Christian "dogs" and "swine," it was a consciousness, the content of which must be classed with that of other remote metaphysical categories. Until comparatively recent times no compatriot metaphysician could have convinced many members of such groups that their conduct toward the antagonistic group was rooted in appreciation of likeness. The evolution of society has gone forward under conditions of contact between group and group which implicitly repudiate a large proportion of the implications of identity. Yet these predominantly hostile contacts of human groups constitute a very considerable portion of the data in which we have to discover the forces and the processes of the evolution both of societies and of society. The confessed incongruity and inconvenience of employing the sympathetic term "social" however, for phenomena both of sympathy and hostility, amounts to a demand which the term "societary," seems to me fitted to supply.

It was with reference to the foregoing distinctions that I ventured to substitute for the formula—"sociology is the science of the phe-

nomena of contract,” the more widely generalized proposition;—“sociology deals especially with the phenomena of *contact*.”* Thus Japan and China, during the progress of the war in Corea, are furnishing sociological data, just as they will be under the terms of the consequent treaty, and the data in the former case are “social,” according to the sociologists’ connotations, just as much as in the latter; that is, they are phenomena not of isolated, individual life, but of group or societary action and reaction. The like is true of the American Railway Association, and the Association of General Managers. The ordinary connotations of the term “social” however, are undoubtedly less inclusive, and there is conscious awkwardness and embarrassment in discussion, growing out of the necessity of frequent transition from use of the term “social” in its traditional and popular sense, to the more arbitrary sense which we have tried to fix upon it for technical purposes. This being the case, I am convinced that advantage will be gained by substituting the term “societary” in connections which do not demand the more specific term.

This expedient suggested itself recently, while for the hundredth time I was trying to invent satisfactory equivalents for the terms *Socialwissenschaft* and *Gesellschaftswissenschaft*. These words mean, to most writers and readers, precisely the same thing. If an author prefers one of them, it is on purely superficial grounds, and the employment of both is merely *oratio variata*. The Latin portion of the former word is of course etymologically restricted precisely as it is in English. It consequently lends itself to the same ambiguity. It fares no better with the German substitute in the latter word; and the adjective *gesellschaftlich* is by derivation and custom even more completely devoted to expression of friendly relations than are the German or English derivatives from the Latin root. As I have remarked above there is a clearly distinguishable body of phenomena, however, which terms containing connotations of fraternity do not naturally comprehend. I fancy that a few German writers are trying to be consistent in applying one of the above terms to the more inclusive category, reserving the other for the more special relations characterized by friendliness, but I have discovered no case of marked success in the attempt. At all events it seems to me that in this instance English terminology may adapt itself more readily than the German to expression of a necessary distinction. Whether we assume or not that sympathetic feelings are characteristic of societies as such, or that sympathy is the cohesive force of societies as such, we have to deal with societies in conditions in which the spirit of hostility is more demonstrative than the spirit of co-operation. We obviously need

* Small and Vincent. “Introduction to the Study of Society,” p. 60.

then a word plainly appropriate to the phenomena of societies as such, without prejudgment of the content or quality of the phenomena. We have the word ready made. Whatever is *of or pertaining to society* is "societary." The word stands for the last abstraction of the reality "society," and in spite of its community of origin with the word which has become a cause of offence, there should be no difficulty in applying the term "societary" so as to avoid most of the ambiguity lurking in the more attributive form "social."

The need of thus enlarging our vocabulary impressed me very forcibly in connection with Dr. Simmel's latest discussion of the task of sociology.* That paper seems to me to contain an important contribution to societary analysis, although I should be sorry if the name sociology should be restricted to the application for which Simmel contends. He makes it very clear that there is a field for investigators for which I can find no more exact phrase than "societary science," though I should regard it as unfortunate if the phrase were restricted to the limits which Simmel proposes. To me the problems which he would include in this department of science present themselves as a natural division of descriptive sociology. The relation of this division to other groupings of the subject-matter in closest connection with it seems to me, in more respects than one, very much like the relation of geometric crystallography, first to mineralogy and later to departments of knowledge in less immediate connection with crystallography. I should say in particular that the same difficulty which is experienced in the case of crystallography and mineralogy in keeping the definable boundaries distinct in practice, would be encountered in attempting to maintain the separate existence of the aspect of societary science which Simmel would name sociology.

Simmel says: "Society in the broadest sense evidently exists wherever several individuals come into inter-relation. From ephemeral union for a promenade to the intimate unity of a family or of a mediæval guild, there are socializations (*Vergesellschaftungen*) of the most diverse grades and kinds. The special causes and aims without which, of course, societary formation is never accomplished, constitute in a degree the body or material of the associational process. That the outcome of these causes, the furthering of these aims, produces reciprocity or socialization between their agents, is the form in which these contents clothe themselves; and upon the dissociation of this form from these contents, by means of scientific abstraction, depends the whole existence of a special *Gesellschaftswissenschaft*." (Can we translate the thought more accurately than in the phrase *societary science*?) "This follows from the fact that the same form, the same

* "*Das Problem der Sociologie*," in Schmöller's *Jahrbuch*, 1894, pp. 1301 *et seq.*

species of societary structure, may emerge with the most dissimilar material, for the most unlike purposes. Thus there is not only ‘society’ in the most general sense, in the case of a religious community as in the case of a band of conspirators, in the case of a trade organization as in that of an art school, in a popular assembly as in a family—but further formal similarities extend to the special configuration and developments of such associations. In the case of societary groups which in their purposes and in ethical character are most widely contrasted, we find for example the same forms of superior and inferior order, of competition, of opposition, of division of labor; we find the structure of a hierarchy, the incorporation of the constructive principles of the group in symbols, the division into parties, the various stages of freedom or bondage of individuals in relation to the group, the crossings and stratifications of the groups themselves, definable forms of reaction of the groups against external influences, etc. All this . . . is a realm of phenomena susceptible of distinct abstraction, viz., the phenomena of the integration of societies as such, and of their various forms.”

The consideration which I urge is not dependent at all upon agreement with or dissent from Simmel’s program of a distinct science of societary geometry or morphology; it does not stand or fall with agreement or refusal to employ the term “sociology” in any proposed sense; it does not require adoption of any implied estimate of the relative importance of the phenomena of attraction and of repulsion in human society. It gets its force from perception that the facts about society cannot be thoroughly analyzed and correctly correlated unless, during certain parts of the process, they be viewed in their purely objective aspects, not as demonstrations of motive but as forms of contact between individuals—as societary phenomena in the most general sense, distinguished on the one hand from phenomena of isolated individual activity, and on the other hand from phenomena of those particular orders or conditions of society which are evolved or preserved by sympathy. Whether we agree or not with Simmel about the desirability of a distinct science of societary forms, I submit that it is worth while to see if it is possible to eliminate an element of confusion in discussion, by withdrawing the term “social” from use in cases where it is unnecessary for the purposes of the argument to predicate conscious and positive sympathy as an element in the phenomena, and by substituting the less equivocal term “societary.”

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